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I. INTRODUCTION
Any highly advanced and innovative technology tends to present the
legal system with a myriad of problems. This is especially true in the
case of frozen embryos because the focus of the technology deals with
creating life. Moral and ethical implications cloud the issues surrounding
frozen embryos causing great controversy. Whether such technology
should continue to be used is beyond the scope of this note.' This note is
ISee Wurmbrand, Frozen Embryos: Moral, Social, & Legal Implications, 59
S.CAL.L.REv. 1079 (1986), for a general discussion of whether this technology
should continue, and see Clapp, State Prohibition of Fetal Experimentation and
the Fundamental Right of Privacy, 88 COLUM.L.REv. 1073 (1988), and Robertson,
Decisional Authority Over Embryos and Control of IVF Technology, 1988 Jutj-
METRICS J. 285 (1988) [hereinafter Robertson I], for how much control the state
may exercise over in vitro fertilization programs.
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concerned with the question currently facing the courts: once an embryo
is frozen, what should become of it in a dispute over what should happen
to it, and who has the right to make that decision? In addressing this
question, this note will first establish the process through which frozen
embryos are created, and the resulting dilemma of definitional problems
among the medical and legal professions. Next the article will survey the
current state of the law to discover how prenatal beings have been treated
traditionally, how this should affect frozen embryo disposition, and how
trends are developing in the law. The article will next lay out the moral
and ethical concerns in the decision over how to deal with frozen embryos.
Finally, the article will address the possibility of treating the frozen
embryos as either life or property, and the ramifications of such a decision.
It will also analyze the dispute over frozen embryos as one of a conflict
between separate constitutional reproductive rights. It will conclude by
examining the possibility of creating a separate body of law, free from
traditional constraints.
II. THE IN VITRO FERTILIZATION PROCESS
Unless in vitro fertilization is banned it is unlikely that the procedure
will be abandoned. 2 The in vitro fertilization process begins by giving
fertilization drugs to the woman in order for her to produce an increased
amount of eggs.3 The more eggs produced, the better the chance for fer-
tilization and successful implantation. 4 A laparoscopy is performed to
retrieve the eggs from the woman's uterus.5 These eggs are then fertil-
2 The decline in adoption possibilities due to such factors as the increased
availability of contraceptives and abortions is one reason for the increased interest
in in vitro fertilization. See Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for
Family Law, 69 VA. L.REv. 465, 466-67 (1983) (listing other factors tending to
reduce the possibility of adoption). In vitro fertilization also creates real hope for
infertile couples to produce offspring that are genetically related to both parents.
In rarer cases in vitro fertilization may create offspring that are genetically
related to only one or neither parent. This is accomplished by using in vitro
fertilization in combination with sperm from a donor, or an egg from a donor. To
further remove the process from the "adopting" parents, artificial gametes may
be used in conjunction with a surrogate to gestate the egg fertilized in vitro.
3 Robertson I, supra note 1, at 287.
4 However, increasing the number of successfully fertilized eggs also presents
dilemmas. The infertile couple must now decide between implanting all fertilized
eggs, thereby risking multiple pregnancies, or freezing the remaining fertilized
embryos for future use. If freezing is chosen the potential future complications
are numerous: one spouse may die; a divorce may occur; or the couple may have
reached their optimum number of children but not utilized all of the frozen em-
bryos. This article will address who should direct the fate of these embryos.
5 A laparoscopy is an operation to remove mature eggs from the female. During
the operation a thin tube is inserted through the abdominal wall to observe the
ovaries. If satisfied that the eggs are mature, the doctor will remove the eggs
from the ovaries by way of vacuum through this thin tube. Gregoratos, Tempest
in the Laboratory: Medical Research on Spare Embryos from In Vitro Fertilization,
37 HASTINGS L.J. 977, 980 and n.26 (1986).
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ized.6 After the fertilized egg has matured to the point where it can be
implanted, it will either be implanted or frozen for future use.7 The process
is mainly used where the female has problems transmitting her eggs
through her fallopian tubes to her uterus where implantation must occur
after fertilization.8
III. DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS SURROUNDING THE PRODUCTS OF
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
The advent of in vitro fertilization has revealed the early forms of
human creation to the human eye and human manipulation. Stages,
which could never before have been supervised by medical professionals,
are now open for inspection. The terminology developing around the early
pre-implantation stage is diverse. As Professor Robertson has stated, "we
are still searching for a language to describe the entity created by ex-
tracorporeal fertilization and the activities then done to it."
9 Essential to
this discussion is a basic list of definitions. These definitions, although
having specific meanings, will often be used loosely because of overlaps
in stages and disagreements over terms. For the purposes of this paper
the following definitions will be utilized. Technically freezing embryos is
done through a process called cryopreservation. 10 A gamete
1 will be used
to refer either to an egg or a sperm cell. A conceptus, in this article, will
be used to refer to the immediate joining of the egg and sperm cell, before
cleavage takes place.'2 The term conceptus may be used interchangeably
with "fertilized egg" or even pre-embryo at its earliest stages. A 
zygote1"
6To fertilize, each egg is placed in a separate petri dish containing a special
medium, to which the sperm is then added. After fertilization, the conceptus (the
product of the union of egg and sperm) is then transferred to a dish containing
a different solution of blood and nutrients in order to help the conceptus develop
normally. Id. at 980-81.
7 When the conceptus begins to divide into two, four, and eight cells it is
commonly called a zygote or fertilized egg. It is during this two to eight cell stage
that the zygote is transferred to the female's uterus or frozen. Robertson, Embryos,
Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction,
59 S. CAL. L.REv. 942, 968 (1986) [hereinafter Robertson U1]. See also infra note
45.
8 In vitro fertilization may also be used to overcome a couple's infertility prob-
lem due to a man's low sperm count. In vitro fertilization will aid the couple
because the sperm will not have to travel as far to meet the egg when placed
together in a petri dish. Robertson II, supra note 7, at 944.
1Robertson II, supra note 7, at 952.
10 Cryopreservation is usually performed with liquid nitrogen. Wurmbrand,
supra note 1, at 1083.
11 A gamete is "a germ cell possessing the haploid number of chromosomes,
especially a mature sperm or egg capable of participating in fertilization." AMER-
ICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 546 (2nd college ed. 1982).
12 Some authors use the term conceptus to refer to the product of a union
between the egg and sperm up until the time of birth.
13 A zygote is either "1. The cell formed by the union of two gametes. [or] 2.
The organism that develops from a zygote as characterized by its genetic consti-
tution and subsequent development." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1408 (2nd
college ed. 1982).
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is the formation of the conceptus after cleavage.14 Some courts talk in
terms of a cryopreserved zygote or a pre-zygote instead of a frozen em-
bryo. 5 However, the term over which the most controversy has taken
place is pre-embryo. It has been defined as: "[t]he human entity existing
before the passage of fourteen days of development, prior to attachment
to the uterine wall and the development of the primitive streak. The term
is used by some to distinguish a difference between a zygote in its early
stages and an embryo in its later stages.' 5 An embryo on the other hand
strictly means the developing human after implantation in the uterus
until eight weeks.17 However, the term is often commonly used to refer
to any stage before that of fetus. An embryo is thought to develop into a
fetus after the eighth week.18 Between fetuses, there is a further dis-
tinction between viable and unviable fetuses. Viability is the point at
which the fetus is "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb,
albeit with artificial aid."' 9
14 Cleavage is the "[pirocess of dividing, as of the fertilized egg into successive
multiples of cells, from the single cell; line formed by a groove between two parts."
Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496 (5th Dist. Tenn. Sept. 21, 1989) (1989 Tenn. App.LEXIS 641, at 8), rev'd, No. 180 (Tenn. App. Sept. 13, 1990) (1990 Tenn. App.LEXIS 642) (citing from Dictionary of Medical Terms for the Nonmedical Person(2d. ed. 1989)).
15 See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
'
6 Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496 (5th Dist. Tenn. Sept. 21, 1989) (1989 Tenn.App. LEXIS 641, at 10), rev'd, No. 180 (Tenn. App. Sept. 13, 1990) (1990 Tenn.App. LEXIS 642). The Committee defines a pre-embryo as "a product of gametic
union from fertilization to the appearance of the embryonic axis. The preem-bryonic stage is considered to last until 14 days after fertilization." Id. at *17.
Note, however, that not all scientists concur in the use of this term. Dr. JeromeLejeune does not believe in the term pre-embryo. He asserts, "[tihere is no need
for a subclass of the embryo to be called a preembryo, because there is nothingbefore the embryo; before an embryo there is only a sperm and an egg; when the
egg is fertilized by the sperm the entity becomes a zygote; and when the zygote
divides it is an embryo." Id. at *14-15.
17 Even commentators who go to great lengths to differentiate between pre-
embryos and embryos often interchange the two terms. See Davis v. Davis, No.
E-14496 (5th Dist. Tenn. Sept. 21, 1989) (1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at 21-22),
rev'd, No. 180 (Tenn. App. Sept. 13, 1990) (1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642) (the court
notes that Dr. King and Professor Robertson both refer to zygotes of the two to
eight celled stage as embryos, even though they have professed to adopt the term
pre-embryo).
11 Over the confusion between fetus and embryo, Gregoratos has stated: "Tech-
nically, the terms 'embryo' and 'fetus' refer to different gestational stages in thedevelopment of the unborn conceptus, the embryo being an earlier stage that
lasts until the end of the eighth week. The law does not distinguish on this basis,
however, and uses the term 'fetus' to refer to all stages of development. Instead,
the law differentiates at the point of viability and live birth." Gregoratos, supra
note 5, at 987.
19 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973). Roe also states that viability generally
begins at about the twenty-eighth week, but may begin as early as the twenty-
fourth week.
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Various organizations and courts have adopted different characteri-
zations of the above definitions in discussing issues involving reproduc-
tion. Understanding these definitions is essential to understanding the
reasoning of various scholars and judges. The viable fetus is the most
advanced of the above types of pre-life, and should therefore be afforded
a greater number of rights then lesser forms of pre-life. It follows then
that not all rights enjoyed by a viable fetus will be attributed to lesser
forms of pre-life such as an embryo, and also that if a viable fetus does
not enjoy a certain right, there is no basis upon which a lesser developed
form of pre-life can enjoy such a right. With this in mind, the current
status of the unborn will now be discussed.
IV. STATUS OF AN EMBRYO
A survey of present law in the United States is necessary to assess the
rights of the unborn. The issue of whether an unborn is entitled to any
rights, and if so what they are, has appeared in several different areas
of law. Although these areas of law are not always consistent in outcome,
this analysis will help in developing a basis for further determining how
disputes over frozen embryos should be resolved.
In the area of tort law, statutes generally dictate that a fetus, at least
an unviable one,20 may not sustain an action for wrongful death unless
first born alive.2 Such statutes are derived from the common law rule
that unviable fetuses are unable to sustain actions for wrongful death
because they are not yet persons in existence. 22 An embryo is not as
advanced as a fetus, let alone a viable fetus. Therefore, a frozen embryo
should not have the right to object to being disposed of or of "dying a
passive death". Further, because a frozen embryo of two to eight cells
does not constitute a viable fetus, the state should not be able to intervene
on the embryo's behalf and object to disposal on the grounds that it would
be a wrongful death.
2 3
Another question in the torts area of rights of an unborn fetus, is
whether a fetus can maintain an action for injuries occurring before birth.
Every jurisdiction now allows a fetus to bring such an action, provided
20 See Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 LoY. L.REV. 357, 368 (1986)
(agreeing that a pre-viable conceptus may not maintain an action for wrongful
death generally). But see Gregoratos, supra note 5, at 989 (a viable fetus may be
able to recover for wrongful death in some jurisdictions).
21 "The child, if he is born alive, is now permitted in every jurisdiction to
maintain an action for the consequences of prenatal injuries, and if he dies of
such injuries after birth an action will lie for his wrongful death." W. KEETON, D.
DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEATON ON TORTS § 55, at 368 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
2 Prosser explains this theory by saying "the defendant could owe no duty of
conduct to a person who was not in existence at the time of his action." Id. § 55,
at 367.
Compare to abortion principles discussed infra notes 32-35, 114-119 & ac-
companying text.
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that the fetus is born alive.24 However, there is still some dispute as to
whether the fetus has to be viable at the time of injury in order to recover
after being born alive. In most cases in which recovery has occurred the
fetus has been viable.2 5 This would appear to give a fetus limited rights,
dependent upon live birth. Therefore, under this type of limited right, an
embryo should not be able to maintain an action against parents or phy-
sician for wrongful disposal because the embryo will never be born alive,
a pre-requisite to maintaining this type of action. Secondly, at the time
of the alleged "harm" the frozen embryo is not viable.
In the area of criminal law, an action for homicide will not lie for the
killing of an unborn fetus. The rationale behind this policy decision has
it roots in common law. Common law defines homicide as "the killing of
one human being by another. '26 From this definition courts reasoned that
there could be no homicide without the killing of another human being.
An unborn child was not a human being within the meaning of such
definition because an unborn child was not considered a person or a
reasonable creature in being before its birth. This, therefore, precluded
a conviction for killing an unborn fetus. Modern jurisprudence has ad-
dressed this problem by having the states adopt various statutes to de-
termine who is a person for purposes of homicide. Most state statutes
follow the common law rule by requiring that the fetus be born alive in
order to constitute a person. 27
24 See supra note 21.
25 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 21, § 55, at 368. See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz,
65 F.Supp 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (first case allowing recovery to child who had beeninjured as a viable fetus). However, there is a growing trend to allow an actionfor prenatal injuries occurring before viability, as long as there is a live birth.The general reason for this, as one court has stated, is that "[w]hether viable or
not at the time of the injury, the child sustains the same harm after birth, andtherefore should be given the same opportunity for redress." Andrews, supra note20, at 381 (citing Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 367, 157 A.2d 497, 504(1960)).
26 Annotation, Homicide Based on Killing of Unborn Child, 40 A.L.R.3d 444,
446 (1971).
1 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-201 (1982) (repealed 1989) (Tennessee
requires that the victim be a "reasonable creature in being.") In construing theTennessee statute, the court in Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. 417, 256 S.W. 433(1923), held that in order to sustain a conviction for murder, the child must beborn alive. Annotation, supra note 26, at 450. The new version of Tennessee's
murder statute is § 39-13-201 which now defines the standard as the "unlawfulkilling of another person." See also Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105, 722 S.W.2d584 (1987) (unviable fetus is not a person within the meaning of the manslaughter
statute); State v. Anonymous, 40 Conn. Supp. 498, 516 A.2d 156 (1986) (unborn
viable fetus is not a human being within the meaning of murder statute); State
v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985) (an eight and one-half month old fetus is
not a human being for purposes of vehicular manslaughter statute). But see People
v. Apodaca, 76 Cal. App.3d 479, 142 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1978) (defendant found guilty
of murder for killing a fetus of 22-24 weeks).
[Vol. 38:4
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In the area of descent and distribution, an unborn fetus may not inherit
property unless it is born alive.
2
8
In the area of constitutional law, the Supreme Court has refused to
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment, containing the word "person", to
encompass the unborn.29 The Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services30 did not disturb this aspect of the holding.31
The only type of rights constitutional law has afforded fetuses is that
a viable fetus may be protected by the state.
3 2 Previously in Roe v. Wade,33
the Court made this distinction by the trimester approach stating that
28 The rights of the unborn actually attach at conception; however, they are
not perfected until live birth. Gregoratos, supra note 5, at 988. See also UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-108, 8 U.L.A. 66 (1983) ("Relatives of the decedent conceived
before his death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime
of the decedent.").
Since frozen embryos may be brought to life years after the death of a gamete
provider, special laws will have to be promulgated in order to address a frozen
embryo's rights to inheritance, because the estate cannot be tied up upon a con-
tingency of the embryo being born. Louisiana is the first state to address this
issue. Although the statute does not fully address the issue it does provide as
follows:
§ 133. Inheritance rights
Inheritance rights will not flow to the in vitro fertilized ovum as a juridical
person, unless the in vitro fertilized ovum develops into an unborn child
that is born in a live birth, or at any other time when rights attach to an
unborn child in accordance with law. As a juridicial person, the embryo or
child born as a result of in vitro fertilization and in vitro fertilized ovum
donation to another couple does not retain its inheritance rights from the
in vitro fertilization patients.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:133 (West Supp. 1989).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). The Court also failed to answer the
related question of when life begins, saying:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those
trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy and theology
are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the
development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the
answer.
Id. at 159.
3o Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
"1 The court in Webster did not disturb this analysis because it refused to rule
on the constitutionality of a preamble to the Missouri statute which stated that
life began at conception. The Court stated, "It will be time enough for federal
courts to address the meaning of the preamble should it be applied to restrict the
activities of appellees in some concrete way .... We therefore need not pass on
the constitutionality of the Act's preamble." Id. at 3050.
31 See supra note 3. One reason advanced why, in the constitutional context,
the court refuses to grant embryos rights, is the competing stronger interests of
the parents. This is why the mother's aborting of a fetus is not murder whereas
another third party's action to harm the embryo would be actionable. Andrews
argues that "because of the strong constitutional protection for autonomy in
procreative decisions, the law gives the progenitors greater discretion in their
action toward the embryo, when those actions are part of reproductive decisions,
than it gives to other persons in their actions toward the embryo." Andrews, supra
note 20, at 368.
33410 U.S. 113.
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the state had no right to protect the fetus in the first trimester, a limited
right to protect the mother's health in the second trimester (but not the
fetus), and a full right to protect the fetus in the third trimester. The
Court's rationale for protecting the fetus in the third trimester is based
on the conclusion that the fetus typically becomes viable at the beginning
of the third trimester. Although Webster has done away with the trimester
analysis, 4 the Court upholds the state's application of viability as the
point at which the state may step in and assert a legitimate interest in
protecting the fetus. The Court does hint that perhaps in the future it
will uphold the state's right to assert an interest in the fetus before
viability.3 5 However, since the Court declined to set any definite lines in
this area, especially by declining to rule on the issue of whether life begins
at conception, the rights of a fetus are not substantially improved, let
alone the rights of a lesser developed form of pre-life such as the pre-
embryo.
One commentator, Gary Gertler, has offered an alternative approach
to determining when the state should be allowed to protect "pre-life" as
life.3 6 He sets the determination, not at viability, but rather at brain
birth, which he defines as that point when "a fetus reaches that stage of
development when recognizable neocortical activity begins. 13 7 His theory
is that the only distinction between human life and other forms of life is
our higher intelligence.- He asserts that neocortical brain activity is an
easier standard to use in determining when "life" begins than viability.
This is because science has advanced far enough that determination of
neocortical brain activity will not keep changing with advanced tech-
nology whereas the viability standard continues to change as technology
creates better methods to sustain life outside of the mothers womb.3 9
Further, he asserts that since brain death is an accepted approach to
when death occurs, so too brain birth should be accepted as the point at
which a being becomes a person.40 In arguing for the adoption of brain
birth as the standard of personhood, Gertler states:
4 "We have not refrained from reconsideration of a prior construction of theConstitution that has proved 'unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.'[Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 546, 105
S. Ct. 1005, 1015, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016(1985)] We think the Roe trimester framework
falls into that category." Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 429 U.S. at
3056.
3 "[W]e do not see why the State's interest in protecting potential human life
should come into existence only at the point of viability, and that there should
therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting
it before viability." Id. at 3057.3 6 Note, Brain Birth: A Proposal for Defining When a Fetus Is Entitled to Human
Life Status, 59 S. CAL. L.REv. 1061 (1986) (authored by Gary B. Gertler) [here-
inafter Note, Brain Birth]
37 Id. at 1062.
3Id. at 1061.39 Id. at 1070 ("One very important advantage of the brain birth standard, at
least from a legal standpoint, is that neocortical brain activity provides a static
and unchanging standard over time.")
0Id. at 1071.
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Since the inception of neocortical brain activity, or brain birth,
is the beginning of cognitive capability, it is the point at which
personhood protection should begin. Brain birth is not merely
an index, sign, or litmus test of being human; it is a more basic
trait that should be recognized as conferring personhood on
whomever possess it. All and only those beings having neocortical
brain activity have the right to basic human rights... 41
Because the Court in Webster acknowledged the problems in using the
viability standard, it is conceivable that the Court may soon be looking
for an alternative method for determining "personhood" under the 14th
Amendment and when life should be said to begin for purposes of pro-
tection and rights.
Since the various areas of law have not afforded fetuses any concrete
rights to maintain actions unless live birth occurs, or in the case of con-
stitutional law, any right to be protected under the Constitution unless
live birth is probable, it is doubtful that pre-embryos or frozen embryos
should be afforded any right to be born. This is especially true considering
that even at the best clinics there is less than a ten percent chance of
creating a live birth baby from a frozen embryo.42 This relatively small
likelihood of creating a "person" does not encourage bestowing any rights
upon frozen embryos. Even if the standard of viability for determining
when life begins is changed to a new standard such as brain birth,
43 a
four- to eight-celled zygote would not be afforded protection as a person.
Only a drastic change stating that life begins at conception would confer
"personhood" status upon a frozen four- to eight-celled embryo.
V. DEALING WITH MORAL AND ETHICAL BELIEFS
Before addressing such questions as whether frozen embryos constitute
life, one must acknowledge one controlling principal of our government-
the separation of church and state.44 Various religions need not agree on
the morality of laws, they must only abide by those the legislature has
deemed worthy of passing. The laws then act like a floor of morality,
beneath which no citizen may fall without being punished by the law.
41 Id. at 1069.
42Robertson states: "The chance that any single transferred embryo will im-
plant is said to be one in ten, which means an even lower chance that it will
come to term, since there is usually a 25 to 35% wastage or spontaneous abortion
of implanted embryos." Robertson II, supra note 7, at 970 n.100.
43 See Note, Brain Birth, supra note 36, at 1062.
"See generally Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The court noted,
"In the words of Jefferson, the clause against the establishment of religion by
law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and state."' Id. at
16. The Court then concluded that the "wall must be kept high and impregnable."
Id. at 18.
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However, if one's morals dictate a more stringent attitude toward a par-
ticular subject, the law allows that person to impose a higher standard
on himself. Depending on one's moral and religious upbringing, the an-
swer to whether these frozen embryos are life will fluctuate, and very
little that is stated in this article will change one's mind.
Some people, feeling that these embryos are human life, will not be
swayed by constitutional arguments that the mother and father have
procreational rights to build or not build a family as they see fit just as
any other coitally reproductive couple would be able to choose. 45 They
would state that this 4-8 celled zygote46 is as much a human being as
anyone else and must be protected by the state at all costs. This author
would remind such proponents that not all human life is protected at all
costs. There are instances in which the legislatures weigh and balance
all competing interests, and sometimes conclude that life at all costs is
not the answer. The closest example is presented by the previously dis-
cussed competing interests in abortion. The embryo is only protected after
viability. Until such a time as viability, the mother's interest in privacy
outweighs the state's interest in protecting potential life. 47 Another less
obvious choice not to protect life at all costs is war. War is undertaken
in the name of national security but still creates death. The policy of the
United States holds it proper, if the government so chooses, to send men
to foreign countries to die for a cause they may not personally believe in
or to kill others in a military raid to prove a political point. This is not
protecting life at all costs. Yet another choice of death over life is capital
punishment. These are living, breathing human beings, not zygotes,
whose lives the legislature has deemed unworthy of saving at all costs. 48
One must realize that laws balance the interest of the individual against
the interest of the whole. The Constitution of the United States has
delegated the power to balance these interests to the legislature. The
legislature in carrying out its function will focus on the will of the people,
but only to the extent that it is for the good of the people as a whole. The
41 See infra Part IX for a discussion of constitutional reproductive rights.
A fertilized egg goes through cell divisions. Two to eight cell divisions is the
optimum number before the eggs are frozen or transplanted, otherwise the embryo
is developmentally too young to freeze, or after the eight cell stage is too advanced
to develop normally after being thawed. Wurmbrand, supra note 1, at 1083.
17 Roe v. Wade established that viability was the point at which the mother's
interest in privacy became subservient to the state's interest in protecting the
life of a fetus. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services has since validated a statute
which attempts to determine viability at an earlier time than the third trimester,
which is usually thought of as beginning viability. Webster did not overrule the
point of viability as being the point at which state protection should begin, but
it did question the sensibility of such a standard. See infra notes 33-34 & accom-
panying text.
4 The author has no intention of condemning any of the foregoing practices
but rather is pointing out that even if the zygote is life, the issue is not simple
and there must still be a policy decision which must be made by the legislature.
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legislature cannot cater to, and will not consider, factions which threaten
the democratic process. Further, courts will ensure that all legislation is
in accord with the Constitution.
49
VI. THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE AND THE COURTS IN
DISPUTES OVER FROZEN EMBRYOS
Recognizing that there is no "right" answer to whether these zygotes
are life, it appears that the legislature, not the legal system, is the proper
forum within which to resolve this difficult issue. However, because the
legislature currently refuses to address such a problem,50 and there is
nowhere for disillusioned parties to turn except the courts, our legal
system must attempt to come to grips with these legal issues.
VII. EMBRYOS AS PROPERTY
At least one group of medical scholars considers frozen embryos as a
form of property. In creating an Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertiliz-
ation, the American Fertility Society explicitly stated: "It is understood
that the gametes and concepti are the property of the donors. The donors
therefore have the right to decide at their sole discretion the disposition
of these items ."..5
The governmental commission in England, the Warnock Committee,
did not explicitly dub frozen embryos as "property" but rather said that
"the couple who stored the embryo should have the use and disposal
rights."52
If the frozen embryo is indeed property, as these two organizations
suggest, the type of property and the rights attached thereto must be
examined.
- Courts also will not be swayed by religious factions such as Right to Life
groups which insist it is unchristian to allow in vitro fertilization. Andrews has
expressed such a view by stating "[n]or is the fact that some people might be
offended by in vitro fertilization, or might have religious objections, sufficient to
restrict couples' use of the technique. Moral approbation is not a sufficient reason
to prohibit exercises of a fundamental constitutional right." Andrews, supra note
20, at 364.
10 The only state which has statutorily begun to address the issue of the status
of a frozen embryo is Louisiana. However, this statute, treating embryos as life,
poses serious constitutional problems. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
Other states have addressed frozen embryos in regard to regulating research upon
them. See infra note 78.
11 Gregoratos, supra note 5, at 991 (quoting the American Fertility Society,
Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertilization, 41 FERTILITY & STERILITY 12 (1984)).
52 Defendant's Brief at 4, Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496 (5th Dist. Tenn. Sept.
21, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Tenn. file) (citing DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILIS-
ATION AND EMBRYOLOGY (1984) (also know as Warnock Committee Report)).
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A. Marital Property
An embryo is not acquired by gift, inheritance or purchase, but rather
created by the effort of both spouses during marriage.53 The Uniform
Marital Property Act5 4 provides that all property acquired during mar-
riage other than by gift, inheritance, or other exceptions55 is marital
property. Most states have adopted the idea of marital property.58 In this
system there is a presumption that anything acquired during the mar-
riage is marital property, but that this presumption may be rebutted by
offering evidence that the specific property at issue falls into one of the
named exceptions.57
Frozen embryos do not appear to fit into one of the categories exempting
them from classification as marital property. However, because frozen
embryos are such a new and technologically advanced concept, inter-
twined with the question of life, a deeper analysis than simply whether
they are covered by an "exception" is needed.
A male's sperm is unquestionably his own personal property. Likewise,
a female's egg is her own personal property. Both sperm and egg could
be said to contain the potential for life, provided that they unite with the
proper opposite gamete, but none would question an individual's right to
dispose of his or her own gamete. Because the sperm and egg have united
to become one, the resulting concepti cannot be said to be the personal
property of either the male or the female, but rather the marital property
of both.
The doctrine of commingling, borrowed from community property and
used in marital property cases, can be applied here. The doctrine states
that "separate property becomes marital property if inextricably mingled
with marital property or with the separate property of the other spouse.5
sAlthough a frozen embryo can theoretically be created by those who are not
spouses, outside the confines of marriage, this article will not address such sit-
uations because laboratories thus far refuse to attempt in vitro fertilization except
for the purpose of aiding infertile married couples reproduce. Most laboratoriesdo accept and use donor gametes, but for the exclusive purpose of providing
married couples with a chance at procreation.
54 UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT, 9A U.L.A. 97 (1987).
5 Common Exceptions: property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or inheri-
tance; property acquired in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise
or inheritance; property which is excluded from marital property by a valid agree-
ment of the parties; and in some of the states property acquired by either spouse
after a judgment of legal separation. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES § 15.2, at 595 (1988).
56Those states which have not adopted the idea of martial property, but instead
rely on a system of community property are governed by basically the same
principles of distribution. Id. § 15.2, at 596.
57 Id. § 15.2, at 596 . See also Zillert v. Zillert, 395 A.2d 1152 (Me. 1978)(property will be treated as marital property unless evidence to the contrary is
produced).
98 H. CLARK, supra note 55, § 15.2, at 596 n.10.
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Therefore it can be argued that when the egg and sperm unite, they are
no less the property of the gamete owners, but rather since they are
inseparable without resorting to destruction, they become marital prop-
erty instead of personal property.
The problem with treating frozen embryos as marital property comes
into existence when the marital property is to be distributed. Many states
have equitable distribution statutes which authorize the court to divide
the property and set up guidelines.59 These statutes provide for the di-
vision to be "equitable, or just, or reasonable" but often times leave the
precise manner to the discretion of the courts. The Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act 6° lists several factors judges should consider in making an
equitable distribution of the property. However, many of these guidelines
deal with monetary value and economic circumstances. 61 Clearly, these
types of guidelines are inapplicable to resolving a dispute over such prop-
erty as a frozen embryo.
62
If the frozen embryos are to be treated as property, the court or legis-
lature must develop some sort of guidelines for distributing this type of
property. The possibility of distributing on the basis of intended use, and
the problems this type of guideline could create will be discussed infra.
6 3
B. Case Law Favoring Treating Embryos as Property
The only American case to decide that frozen embryos are a type of
property is York v. Jones.- Although this case involved a dispute over a
frozen embryo, called a pre-zygote in the case, it was not in the context
of a divorce. Rather, the progenitors of the cryopreserved human pre-
zygote brought an action against the Jones Institute conducting the in
vitro fertilization program and storing the pre-zygote to obtain possession
" Id. § 15.1, at 590 and § 15.3, at 600.
60 UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987).
11 Factors to consider under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act in the
distribution of property: "the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the
marital property, including his contribution as a homemaker; the value of their
separate property; the duration of the marriage; and the economic circumstances
of each spouse when the division is to become effective." H. CLARK, supra note
55, § 15.3, at 601. Furthermore, it has been stated "In order to make a just and
equitable division of the property between spouses, the trial court must nearly
always place a monetary value upon that property. Failure to do so is generally
a ground for reversal." Id. § 15.4, at 604.
62 Even cherished personal property is reduced to being appraised upon divorce.
An appraiser will consider such factors as original cost, price, quality, uniqueness,
availability, taste, times, and geographic area. Jersin, Putting a Value on Personal
Property, 2 FAM. ADvoc. 14 (1979). These factors also seem to fall short of providing
guidelines to deal with the dispute in ownership of frozen embryos.
6 Some judges may make their decision based upon moral factors such as
whether the spouse desires to use the frozen embryo to create life or for destruc-
tion. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. See also infra text following
note 125 for discussion of presumption in favor of procreation.
717 F.Supp 421 (E.D.Va. 1989).
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of their cryopreserved human pre-zygote. The couple wanted to transfer
the pre-zygote to another institute. The Jones Institute refused to consent
to an inter-institutional transfer of the pre-zygote. The judge looked upon
the relationship between the couple and the institute as a bailor/bailee
relationship65 , and further referred to the contract 66 between the couple
and the institute which consistently referred to the pre-zygote as the
property of the couple. The contract even went so far as to state "that in
the event of a divorce, the legal ownership of the pre-zygote 'must be
determined in a property settlement' by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion. '6 7 The judge determined that the pre-zygotes were in fact property
by holding that an action in detinue did lie.r
Although the judge in this case did not face the question of whether
one spouse has a greater property interest in the pre-zygote than another,
this case is judicial precedent for the view that frozen embryos are to be
treated as property for the resolution of disputes.
Another case which may be said to imply that the frozen embryos are
property is Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital Medical Center.6 9 In this case
A bailor/bailee relationship implies the finding that the pre-zygote was prop-
erty. Only property is exchanged in a bailor/bailee relationship. "Life" would be
designated by a temporary custody or guardianship relationship.
6 Contracts many times can define the legal relationships between parties and
the law that should be applied in a particular situation. Therefore many institutes
containing an in vitro fertilization program require the participants to sign a
contract before entering the in vitro fertilization program. The court in York
supplied pertinent excerpts of the contract in the opinion as follows:
We may withdraw our consent and discontinue participation at any time
without prejudice and we understand our pre-zygotes will be stored only as
long as we are active IVF patients at the Howard and Georgeanna Jones
Institute For Reproductive Medicine or until the end of our normal repro-
ductive years. We have the principle responsibility to decide the disposition
of our pre-zygotes. Our frozen pre-zygotes will not be released from storage
for the purpose of intrauterine transfer without the written consents of us
both. In the event of divorce, we understand legal ownership of any stored
pre-zygotes must be determined in a property settlement and will be released
as directed by order of a court of competent jurisdiction. Should we for any
reason no longer wish to attempt to initiate a pregnancy, we understand
we may choose one of three fates for our pre-zygotes that remain in frozen
storage. Our pre-zygotes may be: 1) donated to another infertile couple (who
will remain unknown to us) 2) donated for approved research investigation
3) thawed but not allowed to undergo further development.
York v. Jones, 717 F.Supp at 424 (emphasis added).
6, Id.
61 According to Blacks Law Dictionary "detinue" is defined as "[a] form of action
which lies for the recovery, in specie, of personal chattels from one who acquired
possession of them lawfully, but retains it without right, together with damages
for the detention." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 405 (5th ed. 1979). Further "chattel"
is defined as "[a]n article of personal property... it may refer to animate as well
as inanimate property." Id. at 215. By holding that the couple had an action in
detinue, the judge was in effect ruling that the pre-zygotes were the personal
chattel of the couple.
69 No. 74-3558, slip. op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978) (The author being unable to
obtain a copy used a summary of the case contained in Andrews, Legal Status of
the Embryo, 32 LoY. L.R. 357, 367-8 (1986)).
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a couple had entered into an in vitro fertilization program. A fertilized
embryo was created, but the hospital, before implanting the fertilized
embryo into the woman, destroyed it. The couple sued alleging conversion
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Both issues went to the
jury, but only the allegation of intentional infliction of emotional distress
was upheld. However, it is reasoned that "since an embryo could not be
converted unless it constituted 'property', and the definition of 'property'
would seem to be an issue of law, the court's willingness to instruct the
jury on conversion implies a finding that the embryo was 'property'."
7 0
Similarly, since no criminal action was brought alleging murder, it is
doubtful that the embryos were thought to be life.
A third case, Moore v. Regents of the University of California,7' although
not dealing directly with frozen embryos, has an enormous impact on
their treatment as property.72 This case involves a man who, suffering
from cancer, had his spleen removed upon his doctor's recommendation.
The doctors at the hospital discovered that Moore's cells were unique and
could be used to develop pharmaceutical products to fight certain infec-
tions, diseases and cancer. Without Moore's knowledge or consent the
doctors continued to work with Moore's cells and eventually patented the
products and procedures to make those products developed from Moore's
cells. The market value of the products created from Moore's cells is
estimated to be approximately 3 billion dollars by 1990.7- Moore, upon
discovery of such facts, filed a lawsuit claiming among other causes of
action, that of conversion. 74 In upholding the Plaintiffs cause of action
for conversion the court necessarily found that the Plaintiffs cells and
70 Defendant and Counter-Plaintiffs Brief at 3, Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496
(5th Dist. Tenn. Sept. 21, 1989) (1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641), rev'd, No. 180
(Tenn. App. Sept. 13, 1990) (1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642). But see Andrews, supra
note 20, at 367-68 stating that the court held that an in vitro fertilization embryo
is not the property of the gamete providers because the jury rejected such a claim.
71 202 Cal.App.3d 1405, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1988).
72 The landmark case-Moore vs. the Regents of the University of California-
reaches far beyond the primary issue: whether Seattle businessman, John
Moore, has property rights to his spleen. The decision may expand patients'
rights, add a dimension to the controversy over the use of fetal tissue in
research, provide a further piece of the puzzle in the ownership of eggs and
sperm, and even put a new wrinkle in the abortion issue.
Ferrell, Human Tissue at Issue, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 28, 1990, at 1-G,
col. 1. Later in the article, Lori Andrews, a research fellow at the American Bar
Foundation in Chicago, reiterates the same sentiment, "if the California Supreme
Court determines that Moore has property rights to his spleen, the ruling will
affect abortion, fetal tissue, frozen embryos, eggs and sperm 'in the sense of
recognizing that patients control what is done to their bodies.'" Id. at 4-G, col.
2.
73 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 202 Cal.App.3d at 1409, 249 Cal. Rptr.
at 498 (1988).
14 Moore also alleged the following causes of action : lack of informed consent;
breach of fiduciary duty; fraud and deceit; unjust enrichment; quasi-contract;
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; intentional infliction
of emotional distress; negligent misrepresentation; interference with prospective
advantageous economic relationships; slander of title; accounting; and declaratory
relief. Id.
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other bodily tissue were his property. In reasoning the court quoted Am.
Jur. stating:
As a matter of legal definition, "property" refers not to a par-
ticular material object but to the right and interest or domi-
nation rightfully obtained over such object, with the
unrestricted right to its use, enjoyment and disposition. In
other words, [in] its strict legal sense "property" signifies that
dominion or indefinite right of user, control, and disposition
which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or ob-
jects; thus "property" is nothing more than a collection of
rights.
5
The court then concluded "the essence of a property interest-the ultimate
right of control -therefore exists with regard to one's own human body. 76
The same type reasoning may be applied to frozen embryos. The genetic
material which creates an embryo is no less the property of the owners
than the cells in Moore which made possible the creation of "Cell-line",
a product from Moore's tissue. That the genetic tissue may be used for a
good cause, such as creating life, does not change the fact that the tissue
belongs to its owner and is subject to his right of control. If he refuses to
use his genetic tissue to create a living human being, this is his prerog-
ative. The fact that an admirable purpose is forfeited is of no consequence.
The Moore court, when faced with a similar proposition that valuable
research and products to sustain life would be lost if the plaintiff were
to have the power to control his own body tissue, stated "we concede that,
if informed, a patient might refuse to participate in a research program.
We would give the patient that right."' 77
VIII. FROZEN EMBRYOS AS HUMAN LIFE
Many states have statutes to deal with the subject of research on human
embryos.78 These statutes do not, however, address the problems of what
7 Id. at 1415, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 504. (citing 63A Am.Jur.2d, Property, § 1.)
76 Id. at 1417, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
77 Id. at 1420, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 508.78 Twenty-five states now have fetal research laws. They are:
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-436 to-441(Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West 1984); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 390.001(6),(7) (West 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 81-32,-32.1(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (Burns 1985)) Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.026 (Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §S
14:87.2, 40:1299.35.13 (West 1986 & Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 1593 (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J (Law. Co-op. 1985); MICH.
CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.2685-.2692 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.421-
.422 (West Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.037 (Vernon 1983); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-20-108(3) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-342 to -346 (1979);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-1 to -9A-7 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-01
to -02 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Baldwin 1982); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735 (West 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (Purdon
1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1 (Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 34-23A-17 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-208 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-310 (1978); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-115 (1977).
Andrews, supra note 20, at 396-397.
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exactly frozen embryos are. Neither do they deal with the status or dis-
position of frozen embryos. The only American state which has created
a statute to deal with the status of human pre-embryos is Louisiana.
7 9
The Louisiana legislature has declared their intention that the embryo
be treated as a person,80 not property.8' By bestowing upon them the status
of life/personhood, the legislature has precluded the embryos from being
disposed of lest the act of murder occur.82 Additionally, by bestowing life
71 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:121-133 (West Supp. 1989). It should be noted
that such a statute, although passed, may be deemed unconstitutional. As
of yet the constitutionality of the statute has not been addressed by any
court. However, one commentator has taken the view that the statute is
unconstitutional. "Because of its potential interference with a couples' right
to privacy to make procreative decisions, the new Louisiana law is consti-
tutionally infirm." Andrews, supra note 20, at 409.
80 Section 123. Capacity
An in vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person until such
time as the in vitro fertilized ovum is implanted in the womb; or at any
other time when rights attach to an unborn child in accordance with law.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
81 Section 126. Ownership
An in vitro fertilized human ovum is a biological human being which is
not the property of the physician which acts as an agent of fertilization, or
the facility which employs him or the donors of the sperm and ovum. If the
in vitro fertilization patients express their identity, then their rights as
parents as provided under the Louisiana Civil Code will be preserved. If
the in vitro fertilization patients fail to express their identity, then the
physician shall be deemed to be temporary guardian of the in vitro fertilized
human ovum until adoptive implantation can occur. A court in the parish
where the in vitro fertilized ovum is located may appoint a curator, upon
motion of the in vitro fertilization patients, their heirs, or physicians who
caused in vitro fertilization to be performed, to protect the in vitro fertilized
human ovum's rights.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:126 (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). See also Id. at
§ 9:130(emphasis added):
Section 130. Duties of donors
An in vitro fertilized human ovum is a juridical person which cannot be
owned by the in vitro fertilization patients who owe it a high duty of care
and prudent administration. If the in vitro fertilization patients renounce,
by notarial act, their parental rights for in utero implantation, then the in
vitro fertilized human ovum shall be available for adoptive implantation
in accordance with written procedures of the facility where it is housed or
stored. The in vitro fertilization patients may renounce their parental rights
in favor of another married couple, but only if the other couple is willing
and able to receive the in vitro fertilized ovum. No compensation shall be
paid or received by either couple to renounce parental rights. Constructive
fulfillment of the statutory provisions for adoption in this state shall occur
when a married couple executes a notarial act of adoption of the in vitro
fertilized ovum and birth occurs.
82 Section 129. Destruction
A viable in vitro fertilized human ovum is a juridical person which shall
not be intentionally destroyed by any natural or other juridical person or
through the action of any other such person. An in vitro fertilized human
ovum that fails to develop further over a thirty-six hour period except when
the embryo is in a state of cryopreservation, is considered non-viable and
is not considered a juridicial [sic] person.
Id. § 9:129 (emphasis added).
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status upon the embryos, any dispute over them must be governed by
custody law doctrines-"the best interest of the 'child' doctrine." 3 Also,
due to their status as life, the Louisiana legislature accords frozen em-
bryos rights, such as the right to maintain an action in court."
Treating embryos as life may cause greater problems than imagined.
For instance, once binding precedent has been set decreeing that frozen
embryos are life, a couple, both of whom wish to let the embryos thaw
without implantation, may be enjoined from such action. If the embryos
are treated as life, the state may have a legitimate interest in preserving
their life. The state may require that all embryos be implanted, either
in the egg donor or in a surrogate. 85 Further, if the number of unwanted
embryos rose to a level beyond that for which the government could find
surrogates, could the state force the gamete owners to bring the embryo
to life?s8 Finally, could the state ban any further attempts at in vitro
fertilization for couples wishing to create their own genetic offspring, who
13 Section 131. Judicial standard
In disputes arising between any parties regarding the in vitro fertilized
ovum, the judicial standard for resolving such disputes is to be in the best
interest of the in vitro fertilized ovum.
Id. § 9:131.
M Section 124. Legal Status
As a juridical person, the in vitro fertilized human ovum shall be given
an identification by the medical facility for use within the medical facility
which entitles such ovum to sue or be sued. The confidentiality of the in
vitro fertilization patient shall be maintained.
Id. § 9:131.
85Andrews, supra note 20, at 402 (professing position that a person should not
be forced to donate the embryos to another couple). Robertson, a leading com-
mentator has expressed the same sentiment:
Even if the state or IVF programs have the constitutional authority to insist
on transfer or donation of all embryos, the wisdom and desirability of man-
datory embryo donation policies can be questioned. Given the powerful
meanings aroused by biological offspring, creating biological offspring
against a person's wishes should require a very strong justification. Since
the rights of embryos are not violated by discard, imposing unwanted bi-
ological offspring on a person seems a heavy price to pay for a symbolic
statement of commitment to human life generally.
Robertson II, supra note 7, at 981.
1 This would be a futile attempt to save potential life because the gestator of
the embryo may well decide to have an abortion following implantation of the
embryo. Further, the government cannot force a person to act in a certain manner.
Even where a contract for personal services has been signed, a court of law cannot
force a person to perform the personal services he or she has contracted to perform,
but may merely enjoin the performance of such services for anyone else. See e.g.,
Lumley v. Wagner, 1 DeG.M. & G. 604, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852) (an opera
singer who broke her contract to sing at one opera house was enjoined from singing
at another until her contract was fulfilled).
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are otherwise coitally unable? 7 These are but a few of the questions which
will ensue if the frozen embryos are to constitute life.
Assuming the frozen embryos are treated as life, the dispute in own-
ership between spouses would most likely be treated as a custody issue.
However, this too creates problems, because the unborn have not been
recognized by the Supreme Court as persons.8 8 Inherent qualities of a
child in a custody dispute are: 1) that the child be a person, and 2) that
the child be alive. Custody, in regard to children, means that the parent
and child live together and the parent has the right and obligation to
supervise and care for the child. Reciprocally, the child also has duties
to the parents such as the duty of respect.8 9 This type of definition pre-
supposes that the child is alive.
Another problem with the custody approach is that if the court awards
custody to one of the spouses, does this spouse have an affirmative duty
"I A state statute banning in vitro fertilization would be subject to strict scru-
tiny because it would affect the fundamental right to procreate. In order to uphold
such a statute the state must demonstrate that the statute furthers a compelling
interest in the least restrictive manner possible. Andrews, supra note 20, at 361.
The state may profess a compelling interest in protecting embryos because it
believes the embryos to be life. Louisiana has created a statute based on such an
interest. However, this type interest may not be considered compelling because
the Supreme Court has not recognized the pre-viable fetus as life. See supra note
79 for a discussion of the Louisiana statute.
The court will examine a professed compelling interest very carefully before
invalidating a fundamental right. In Carey v. Population Services International,
the compelling interest advanced in prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to a
minor was that of protecting the health of minors by deterring sexual activity.
The court struck this down saying "[w]e again confirm the principle that when
a state, as here, burdens the exercise of a fundamental right, its attempt to justify
that burden as a rational means for the accomplishment of some significant state
policy requires more than a bare assertation... that the burden is connected to
such a policy." Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 696 (1977).
However, before the court would apply strict scrutiny to the statute banning
in vitro fertilization the court would first have to decide whether the right to
reproduce includes the right to reproduce non-coitally. The equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment would most likely induce courts to decide that the
right to reproduce applies to both fertile and infertile couples. This being so, the
court would have to protect the means (in vitro fertilization) an infertile couple
would have to use to exercise their right to reproduce. If the court were to decide
otherwise, it would be guilty of discrimination against infertile couples. The court
has shown its abhorrence of discrimination in the case of Skinner v. Oklahoma:
"[t]he guaranty of 'equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of
equal laws.'.. . When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed
intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it
has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or
nationality for oppressive treatment." 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (quoting Yick W
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
88Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to Meaning of Term "Person" As Used
in Statutory or Constitutional Provision, 56 L.Ed.2d 895, 906-907 (1979) (noting
that Roe v. Wade failed to find the unborn a person by looking at the historically
freer approaches to abortion and that "none of the contexts in which the term
[person] is used in the Constitution indicates that it has any possible prenatal
application.")
8" H. CLARK, supra note 55, § 19.2, at 789 (1988).
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to bring the frozen embryo to life, despite any change in plans or circum-
stances?90 This would seem to conflict directly with the right to have an
abortion.9 1 Surely if one cannot stop a pregnant woman from aborting
her child, one cannot force a woman to become pregnant. However, if
there is no affirmative duty to bring the embryo to term, would parties
on both sides be encouraged to deceive the court as to their true intentions
by always asserting their desire to bring the frozen embryo to life?
In deciding custody issues, the courts most frequently adopt the doctrine
of "the best interests of the child".92 Because this standard is vague, judges
take many factors into account when deciding the best interests of the
child. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act93 lists some relevant factors
such as: "the wishes of the child's parents, the wishes of the child, the
relationship of the child with his parents and with his siblings, the child's
adjustment to home, school and community, and the mental and physical
health of all individuals involved."94
Clearly these factors do not apply to frozen embryos which are not
developed enough to have brain activity, let alone wishes or relationships
with others.
Despite this, the Tennessee trial court in Davis v. Davis,95 did rule that
embryos are life and disputes over embryos are governed by custody law.
The lawsuit arose in the context of a divorce case. The Davises were
involved in an in vitro fertilization program. They had attempted several
implantations of frozen embryos, all failing. At the point of divorce the
couple had seven fertilized embryos in cryogenic storage. The wife wanted
control of the embryos in order to further attempt to create a child. The
husband wished to avoid becoming a parent because of the divorce and
therefore also sought control over the frozen embryos. The court first
concluded that the embryos were life from the moment of conception, and
then applied the rule of parens patriae, 96 which is really the "best interests
90 See Plaintiffs Brief in Davis v. Davis arguing that the standard of awarding
the embryo to the spouse who professes the intention of bringing the embryo to
life is unfair because there is no affirmative duty on the spouse to carry out the
intention. "Second, while Plaintiff concedes the Defendant's sincere desire and
intention, at present, to attempt to bring two children into being by use of embryos,
this Court naturally cannot force her to do so. Accordingly, a judgment in favor
of the Defendant in this cause would merely grant her the option to use one or
more [of] the pre-embryos. At a later date she would remain free either to abandon
her intention or, after implantation, to abort any fetus developed." Plaintiffs
Brief at 6, Davis v. Davis, (No. E-14496) (5th Dist. Tenn. Sept. 21, 1989) (1989
Tenn. App. LEXIS 641).
91 See infra notes 114-119 and accompanying text for abortion discussion.
92 H. CLARK, supra note 55, § 19.4, at 797 (1988).
93 UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987).
14 H. CLARK, supra note 55, § 19.4, at 798 (1988).
15 No. E-14496 (5th Dist. Tenn. Sept. 21, 1989) (1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641),
rev'd, No. 180 (Tenn. App. Sept. 13, 1990) (1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642).
6Id. at 34.
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of the child" rule. The court reasoned that it was in the best interests of
the frozen embryos to be born, therefore allowing the parent purporting
this same interest to obtain temporary custody of the children.9 7 The court
concluded:
[Ilt is to the manifest best interest of the children, in vitro,
that they be made available for implantation to assure their
opportunity for live birth; implantation is their sole and only
hope for survival. The court respectfully finds and concludes
that it further serves the best interest of these children for Mrs.
Davis to be permitted the opportunity to bring these children
to term through implantation.98
IX. REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
A. Basis and Development of the Constitutional Right to Make
Decisions Concerning One's Own Reproductive Process
The right to make one's own decision about highly personal matters
such as contraception, abortion, marriage and parenting is derived from
the implied right of privacy. Although not fully developed with definite
parameters, this right to privacy is firmly embedded in case law.
99 The
right of privacy in the United States is not explicitly enumerated in the
Constitution. It has developed through case law applying various prin-
ciples of the Constitution. The right of privacy has come to encompass
basic decisions concerning the family unit such as procreation and its
reciprocal, the right not to create life.10
97 Id. at 36. The court said that after the embryos are born, another custody
hearing would be in order to determine the permanent rights of the respective
parties. This implies that fathers in this situation are under some type of duty
to embryos once they are born and cannot escape the responsibilities of fatherhood,
even though they have tried to prevent this occurrence.
98Id.
9 While the outer limits of this aspect of privacy have not been marked by the
Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may make
without unjustified governmental interference are personal decisions "re-
lating to: marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation,
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 (1942);
contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 453-454, id., at 460, 463-465
(White, J. concurring in result); family relationships, Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); and child rearing and education, Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, [262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923)1." Roe v. Wade, supra, at 152-153. See also Cleveland Board
of Education v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974).
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
100 The fundamental right to procreate or to refrain from procreation can be
said to derive from each other because the court in defining the fundamental
right to procreate used the phrase "whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt,
405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis added). This phrase gives birth to both rights. Other
fundamental constitutional rights include reciprocals such as the right to travel
(which includes the right not to travel) and the right to marry (which includes
the right not to marry). See Final Supplemental Amicus Curai Brief at 3, Davis
v. Davis, No. E-14496 (5th Dist. Tenn. Sept. 21, 1989) (1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS
641), rev'd, No. 180 (Tenn. App. Sept. 13, 1990) (1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642).
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An early case which began to stake out the grounds of liberty and the
personal rights protected by the Constitution, Meyer v. Nebraska,"o' stated
that liberty encompassed "the right of the individual ... to marry, es-
tablish a home and bring up children. ,,102 Although this case did not
involve sexual reproductive questions, it did involve the right of a parent
to control the upbringing of his child.103
One of the first cases in the area of reproductive rights was Skinner v.
Oklahoma."0 The Skinner Court held a state statute unconstitutional
which mandated that certain habitual criminals be subject to steriliza-
tion. The Court stated that the right to decide whether one should pro-
create is inherently a personal decision that cannot be superseded by the
state. 
1 0 5
From these two decisions, Meyer and Skinner, the Court has created
"a right to reproduce". 06 Indeed, in Maher v. Roe, the Court stated that
Skinner recognized the "right of procreation". 1 7
In Griswold v. Connecticut,'" the Court realized that there are different
zones of privacy within the broad right itself and then dealt specifically
with the right to privacy in the marriage relationship. In Griswold, a
doctor aided married couples in obtaining contraceptives in violation of
a state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives. Justice Goldberg, in
his concurring opinion, explained the reason for holding the state statute
unconstitutional:
The rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family
are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights
specifically protected.... The fact that no particular provision
of the Constitution explicitly forbids the State from disrupting
the traditional relation of the family-a relation as old and as
fundamental as our entire civilization-surely does not show
that the Government was meant to have the power to do so. 0 9
1 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
102 Id. at 399.
103 In Meyer v. Nebraska, the issue was whether the state had the right to
prohibit children under the level of eighth grade from learning foreign languages.The state tried to advance the theory that its interest in having the childrenforbidden from learning foreign languages was to promote and ensure that Eng-lish would become their mother tongue. The court rejected this argument saying
that an individual has certain rights which must be respected, among these being
the right to acquire useful knowledge. Knowledge of a foreign language cannotbe considered harmful, therefore the state has no right to regulate it. If the statute
were allowed to stand it would deprive a teacher of her basic liberty to teach andparents their liberty to instruct their own children. The Court reasoned that suchbasic liberties are well within the meaning of the Constitution although not
specifically written within. Id. at 401.
104 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
105 Although the Court grounded its decision in the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court was highly affected by the fact that thelegislation involved depriving a man of his basic liberty. See id. at 541.
106 Clapp, supra note 1, at 1081, and 1081 n. 61 (noting Robertson, Procreative
Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV.
405 (1983) takes the view that the right to procreate is strongly implied).
107 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 n. 7 (1977).
108 381 U.S. 479 (1965).109 Id. at 495-496 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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In Eisenstadt v. Baird"0 the Court again dealt with the issue of con-
traception.11 ' The Court said that although Griswold was based on marital
privacy,
the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind
and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each
with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child. z12
Eisenstadt, although decided on equal protection grounds, is often used
as a basis for extending the right of privacy beyond the marital relation-
ship. The right of privacy is an individual right. It encompasses the right
to procreate and the right to not procreate.
Extending Eisenstadt's concept that the right is individual, Carey v.
Population Services Internationalx' held that this right of the individual
to decide its own sexual questions, such as whether to use contraceptives,
also applied to minors. It is evident that single or married, young or old,
each individual has the right to make decisions about his or her own
reproductive choices.
Roe v. Wade 14 takes this personal right to decide whether to bear or
beget children, and insulates it from interference from the state, even
after conception has occurred. The Court recognized that there were com-
peting interests at stake. The woman's right to privacy was pitted against
the state's interest in protecting life. The court concluded that in the
second trimester the state had a limited right to protect the mother's life,
but not until the third trimester did the state have a compelling right to
protect the life of the fetus. Therefore the state had no right to interfere
with a woman's privacy decision during the first trimester, and only a
very limited right to interfere during the second trimester. The Court
emphasized a woman's right to privacy and autonomy in her own body.
In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth"l the Court
further displays its position that the right of privacy in reproductive
matters is an individual right. It holds that the right to have an abortion
cannot be infringed upon, even by a spouse. In striking down the provision
110 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
1 This case was quite similar to Griswold in that it sought to prevent con-
traceptive use, but this time the statute was construed so as to allow married
persons to use contraceptives, but to prohibit single people, thus not invading the
marital right of privacy. The Court struck down this attempt by the legislature
to interfere with the private lives of individuals. It is no business of the govern-
ment whether contraceptives are used to limit family size or merely to enable
individuals to freely enjoy their sexual encounters free from fear of disease.
112 Id. at 453.
113 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
114 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
115 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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of the statute requiring spousal consent to an abortion the Court stated,
"the State cannot 'delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state itself
is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercising during the first
trimester of pregnancy'."'1 16 The Court cites to Eisenstadt"17 professing that
the right to privacy is an individual right.1 1 8 In deciding that the female's
individual right to terminate pregnancy prevailed over the father's in-
dividual right to procreate, the Court seemed again affected by the wom-
an's autonomy in her body. The Court stated, "Inasmuch as it is the
woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and
immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance
weighs in her favor."119
If the embryo is not life with assertable rights, then the focus over a
dispute in embryo ownership may take the form of a conflict between the
rights of the parents. If the dispute involves one spouse wanting to pro-
create and the other spouse wishing to avoid procreation, the issue ul-
timately becomes one of whether there should be a presumption in favor
of creating life or allowing non-existence. If the embryo is life, some
independent rights may be advanced on its behalf which interfere with
the autonomy of parental rights, and any conflict there between. Having
laid the basic framework from which these two competing fundamental
rights stem, this article will now explore the strengths and weaknesses
of each as applied to frozen embryos.
B. Right to Procreate
A litigant may say the right to decide what to do with a frozen embryo
is akin to the decision to procreate. The right to procreate has never been
seriously questioned in the United States.' Most people procreate with-
out ever thinking that they have exercised a fundamental right. This is
because their right has not been challenged by the legislatures.121 Indeed,
the right to procreate is mentioned mostly in dicta, when discussing an
individual's freedom to use contraceptives or carry out an abortion-both
measures aimed at avoiding procreation. However, whether in dicta or
not, "the Supreme Court ... has recognized a married couple's right to
procreate in language broad enough to encompass coital, and most non-
coital, forms of reproduction."' 22 The argument advanced for favoring the
116 Id. at 69.
117 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
118 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. See also Danforth, 428 U.S. at
70 n.11.
119 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71.
- Robertson I, supra note 1, at 290.
121 Robertson II, supra note 7, at 958 ("Although laws regulating fornication,
cohabitation, and adultery have limited the freedom of unmarried persons to
reproduce, laws limiting coital reproduction by a married couple have been no-
tably absent.")122 Id. See also Andrews, supra note 20, at 359. Andrews has expressed a similar
view that precedent dictates that the ability to create children coitally protects
also the decision to produce children noncoitally (relying on case of Surrogate
Parenting Association v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky.
1986).
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right of procreation over the right to avoid procreation would be that as
long as the embryo is already created, neither the state nor a spouse
should be able to forbid the party from using the embryo to create life.
However, this argument is somewhat faulty. Although there is au-
thority to say the decision to procreate is individual and protected from
governmental interference, 123 there is no precedent which dictates
whether the right to procreate should be stronger than the right to refrain
from bearing a child.
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth24 does not purport
to decide which constitutional right is superior, therefore it should not
control the question of whether a woman's decision over a frozen embryo
is insulated from spousal or governmental intrusion. Danforth can only
be used to deny a husband the right to interfere with his wife's decision
to abort a child in utero. Dan forth does not stand for the proposition that
the termination of life (or right to refrain from bearing a child) is the
superior right. Neither does Danforth purport that the woman has the
exclusive control over decisions concerning partially developed embryos.
Because Danforth's analysis rests on the autonomy of the woman's body,
Danforth's holding is inapplicable as applied to in vitro fertilization. 125
One may argue that one reason for favoring the right to procreation
over the right to avoid procreation is that once the gametes have united
to form a conceptus, the spouse wishing to avoid procreation has waived
his or her rights and cannot now complain. He or she has consented to
the conception.
However the issue of consent and waiver is for the courts to decide. It
may be that consent to participate in an in vitro program is not the same
as consent to have a child at any time thereafter. Courts may look upon
a person's surrendering of his or her gametes for use in in vitro fertil-
ization as conditional consent. 126 One reason for concluding consent is
conditional is that many in vitro clinics make the participants sign con-
tracts stating that no frozen embryos will be released from storage except
upon written consent of both spouses.127 This implies that separate consent
is needed to bring an embryo to life.
However, this argument that the right to procreate is superior to the
right to avoid procreation does not take into account who is the better
123 See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text. See also Clapp, supra note
1, at 1081-82.
124 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
125 Contra Final Supplemental Brief of Amicus Curiaeat 3, Davis v. Davis, No.
E-14496 (5th Dist. Tenn. filed Sept. 21, 1989) (1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641), rev'd,
No. 180 (Tenn. App. Sept. 13, 1990) (1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642).
126 Compare to the issue of consent in Moore v. Regents of the University of
California, 202 Cal.App.3d 1230, 249 Cal.Rptr. 494 (1988), discussed supra p.16.
There the court concluded that a patient consenting to surgery for the removal
of an organ does not necessarily consent to the organ and its tissue being used
by surgeons for tests or research.
127 See excerpts from a typical in vitro fertilization clinic's contract between
itself and the gamete providers, supra note 66.
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spouse to award the embryo to if both parties would like to bring the
embryo to life. Where both parties wish to use the frozen embryo for life,
the dispute is more akin to a future custody battle. This is because the
gamete donors remain the same, and only the gestational parents change.
C. Right to Avoid Procreation
1. Right to Use Contraceptives
Professor John A. Robertson has stated, "Freedom to have sex without
reproduction does not guarantee freedom to have reproduction without
sex."'12 So too, the fundamental right to use contraceptives does not guar-
antee the right to use in vitro fertilization as a form of contraception.
The courts must decide whether the right to use contraceptives is broad
enough to include the right to use in vitro fertilization as a method of
contraception. Litigants may say the right to decide what to do with a
frozen embryo is akin to the decision involving use of contraceptives for
the purpose of deciding whether to bear or beget a child. One could argue
that freezing embryos from in vitro fertilization is similar to a type of
contraceptive in that it allows couples to plan and time when they would
have a child. The court has no business directing that the frozen embryos
be used to create life, because this is a decision for the married couple,
and, further, for each individual to decide. A man or woman is entitled
to use contraceptives to avoid the responsibility of becoming a parent
before he or she is personally ready. No one may preclude the person from
so using a contraceptive, not even one's marital partner or one's parents.129
Therefore the court may not take the affirmative action of ordering the
frozen embryos to be brought to life because this would be the equivalent
of stripping the individual who wishes to avoid parental responsibility of
his fundamental right to use a contraceptive. 130 The court cannot thrust
the responsibility of becoming a parent on an individual who wants to
avoid parenthood.13 '
The weak link to the argument is that the court may say the individual
has waived his or her constitutional right to use a contraceptive and
refrain from begetting a child by allowing the egg and the sperm to
128 Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory for Legislation,
44 LA. L. REv. 1641 (1984) (citing Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control
of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 406 (1983)).
129 Carey v. Population Servs., 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
130 It would also be akin to stripping a person of his fundamental right to have
an abortion. See infra notes 133-141 & accompanying text.
131 Contra Robertson II, supra note 7, at 979 stating:
Although the biological link at issue involves procreation, something more
than the procreative label is necessary to establish a right. Whether an
unwanted but unidentified biological link is sufficient to ground a right will
depend upon the social and psychological significance which individuals and
society place on the existence of lineal descendants when anonymity and
no rearing obligations exist.
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unite.132 The purpose of contraceptives is to prevent conception from oc-
curring. The court may say that once conception has occurred the question
of a right to contraceptives is null and void. The court may say it is not
infringing on a constitutional right at all, merely allowing an already
created conception to develop into life if it was to order the frozen embryos
be used for implantation.
2. Right to an Abortion
A litigant may also promulgate the argument that the right to decide
what to do with a frozen embryo is akin to the right to an abortion. That
although conception has occurred, there is a right to terminate preg-
nancy. 33 Although the right to an abortion is limited, the right to ter-
minate before viability, as long as the health of the mother is in no way
affected, is absolute. An embryo frozen for use in in vitro fertilization is
always frozen at the 4-8 cell stage.13 4 This is definitely before viability.
The health of the mother is also not a concern considering the embryo is
outside the woman's body. In this light the decision not to bring the frozen
embryos to life should be protected under the abortion theory.
13 5
It must now be determined whether a man has the same rights to elect
an "abortion" of the embryo as a woman would to have an abortion. The
rights and interests of each party must be weighed as done by the Courts
in Roe and Danforth. In Danforth, it appears the only reason the woman's
decision to abort superseded the man's was that it was the woman's body
which was involved. 13 6 With in vitro fertilization, no such reason exists.
Therefore we are back to the question of superseding rights-should there
be a presumption in favor of procreation or should there be a presumption
that one is free from being forced to procreate against his or her own
will.1, 7
However, the right to abortion can be distinguished in many ways from
the right to decide what to do with a frozen embryo.1 8 First, the right to
12 See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text (consent and waiver ar-
gument).
m On the right to terminate pregnancy see Clapp, supra note 1, at 1082-85.
134 See supra note 7.
131 But see supra note 114 and accompanying text (problem of state's right to
protect life). This determination hinges on a determination of whether the embryo
is life, as discussed supra Part VIII.
136 It should be noted that even where a woman has the right to an abortion
she does not have the right to order the fetus destroyed if it emerges alive from
the abortion, despite the fact that such a genetic link might cause great mental
anguish. Robertson II, supra note 7, at 979 n.133 (discussing Commonwealth v.
Edelin, 371 Mass. 497, 359 N.E.2d 159 (1976)). This situation, however, can be
distinguished from that of a frozen embryo, because a fetus born alive acquires
the rights of personhood which a frozen embryo cannot.
137 See supra Part IX.A.
1' One's views about abortion should not automatically be transferred to the
dilemma of how to treat a frozen embryo. This is because the developmental stage
of a frozen embryo is significantly less than a fetus. Robertson II, supra note 7,
at 974.
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an abortion solely belongs to the woman. The court may not choose to
extend this right to the man in the context of in vitro fertilization. 139
Further, the court may take away the woman's right to have an abortion
in the case of in vitro fertilization because autonomy of the woman's body
is no longer an issue. 140 Finally, the court may say that the right to an
abortion does exist in the context of in vitro fertilization, and that the
man's right is equal to the woman's.
Roe was decided on the superiority of rights between the woman and
the state. The Court had to weigh and balance the rights of each during
the entire pregnancy. During the first trimester the state has an interest
in protecting the fetus; this interest is not, at this point in time, superior
to the right of the woman to decide whether she wants the embryo to
develop inside of her. The state's interest does not become compelling
until the fetus is viable.' 4 ' A 4-8 celled frozen embryo can never be said
to be viable, but the state's interest may still be superior because it does
not have to be weighed against the woman's privacy to her body. The
decision the court will have to face is whether the state's interest in
protecting the embryo as a person is superior to either the woman's or
the man's decision that they do not want parenthood thrust upon them.
D. Case Law Using Constitutional Reproductive Rights
as a Basis for Deciding Disputes Relating to Frozen Embryos
The only court to address a frozen embryo dispute at a constitutional
rights level is Davis v. Davis.142 In Davis the appellate court reversed the
trial court's decision which treated the embryos as life and which applied
custody to the dispute over the embryos. Instead, the appellate court based
its decision upon constitutional law principles stating:
Awarding the fertilized ova to [the former wife] for implanta-
tion against [the former husband's] will, in our view, consti-
tutes impermissible state action in violation of [the former
husband's] constitutionally protected right not to beget a child
where no pregnancy has taken place.
143
,9 If this is so, the woman could be the sole decider of whether a genetic link
would occur. For she could either have the child, or if she wished to avoid a genetic
link, she could circumvent any laws forbidding the destruction of a frozen embryo
by implanting the embryo and then having it aborted.
-4o This would mean there is no constitutional right to avoid genetic links, be
the avoider man or woman, unless the court finds a separate constitutional ground
to protect decisions avoiding procreation.
14Webster challenges the trimester analysis, but upholds viability as a com-
petent method of determining personhood and the state's ability to assert pro-
tection of life.
[42 No. 180 (Tenn. App. Sept. 13, 1990) (1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642).
4 Id. at 5 - 6.
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The court, after finding that the former husband had a constitutional
right to refrain from begetting a child, looked to see whether the state
had a compelling interest which would justify the state's interference
with the former husband's constitutional right. After examining Ten-
nessee's legislative acts, the policies evidenced in those acts and case law,
the court concluded that there was no compelling state interest to justify
interfering with the constitutional right of whether to bear or beget a
child.
The court seemed to imply that the interest in preserving life is the
only state interest that would justify interference with the constitutional
right of whether to bear or beget a child. It did this by first observing
that "'Life' begins in contemplation of the law as soon as an infant is
able to stir in the mother's womb."' 144 The court then proceeded to assess
the state's policy towards fetuses in the womb. It looked to the Tennessee
wrongful death statute which does not allow an action for wrongful death
unless the fetus is first born alive. It therefore concluded that fetuses are
not entitled to the same protection as persons. To bolster this point and
further point out that embryos (and thereby the state because the state
has a right to protect the life) are accorded more rights as they develop
into persons the court then looked to Tennessee's abortion statutes, which
utilize the trimester approach.
145
Concluding that frozen embryos have not attained the legal status of
a person, and therefore the state does not have an interest in protecting
them equivalent to that of protecting life, the court determined that the
state did not have a compelling interest to justify interference with the
constitutional right of whether to bear or beget a child. In so holding the
court stated:
On the facts of this case, it would be repugnant and offensive
to constitutional principles to order [the former wife] to implant
these fertilized ova against her will. It would be equally re-
pugnant to order [the former husband] to bear the psycholog-
ical, if not the legal, consequences of paternity against his
will. 14
6
The court then granted both the former husband and wife joint control
over the frozen embryos, decreeing that each shall have an equal voice
over their disposition.
Although this court's decision seems to imply that frozen embryos are
not yet life, it unfortunately did not decide which constitutional right
should control - the right to bear or the right not to bear children. It
appears that the right to not bear children prevails in this case because
in order for any action to be taken with the embryos, both Davises must
I" Id. at 7 (quoting William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England,
vol. 1, p. 125).
145 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-201.
116 Davis, No. 180 (Tenn. App. Sept. 13, 1990) (1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at
7-8).
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agree. By not agreeing to any action, the frozen embryos remain frozen
in storage thereby allowing Mr. Davis to actually exercise his constitu-
tional right not to have children. By not facing this controversy between
the two constitutional rights head on, the court has invited more cases
of this type to be brought before the courts.
However, since this court did imply that the frozen embryos are not
yet life, it would seem that the state does not have an assertable interest
with respect to the embryos. Therefore, this decision may preclude any
state legislation mandating that the embryos be brought to life or awarded
to one who would bring them to life.
E. Summary of Pundamental Constitutional Right Argument
The courts will have to decide if the claim to reproductive autonomy
is superior to the state's interest in protecting life. Once again the court
will have to face the issue of when life begins. Because a 4-8 celled embryo
is at the most thirty-six hours old, and cannot further develop unless
implanted into a woman's uterus, the court cannot find the embryo viable.
However, since Webster did allude to the fact it might accept or create
another standard for measuring when life begins, the door is not closed.
However, unless the court is willing to hold that life begins at conception,
it is unlikely that a frozen embryo will be found to constitute life which
the state can protect.
As long as the embryo is found not to constitute life, the Supreme Court
will next have to answer whether the right to procreate or the right not
to procreate is stronger. The sitting Court leans toward conservatism,
and therefore would not be likely to expand the area of personal funda-
mental rights relating to contraceptions and abortions. Indeed, the Roe
decision was recently cut back by Webster, indicating such a sentiment.
Additionally, in the complex situation presented, the Court will most
likely reach for the simplest means of deciding the issue. In the conflict
between rights, this may be the scapegoat of waiver or consent.
X. SHOULD A NEW AND DISTINCT BODY OF LAW BE CREATED TO GOVERN
TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED FORMS OF REPRODUCTION?
Present statutory and case law is inadequate in providing a framework
for governing new reproductive technologies. Far fetched analogies and
ad hoc lower court decisions leave the state of the law in turmoil over
disputes arising from such new technology. 147 The problems of artificial
insemination, surrogate mothering and in vitro fertilization are not apt
to disappear on their own. Indeed, the more time that passes, the more
perfected the techniques become, the more attractive the option of uti-
lizing them becomes to individuals.
"4 Robertson II, supra note 7, at 952 n. 48 ("The legal environment is marked
by an absence of direct regulation and uncertainty about the extent to which laws
devised for other purposes will apply.")
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Many states have adopted statutes governing artificial insemination,
but these are largely inadequate and only tip the iceberg in beginning
to resolve disputes over new technologically advanced reproductive meth-
ods. The law in this area should be free to advance without the restraints
of traditional doctrines. As the saying goes "you can't put a square peg
in a round hole," so too you cannot fit new technologically advanced
methods of reproduction into the simple legal framework governing coital
reproduction. 148
The problems with creating a new framework of laws in this area are
numerous. One question is who should devise and who should have con-
siderable input into the new framework - doctors, lawyers, infertile cou-
ples, religious groups? Also, who should fund such an operation? Should
it be a uniform act, able to be accepted or rejected by all the states?
XI. CONCLUSION
The subject of new reproductive technologies must soon be addressed
by the legislatures. Because the question is so emotionally charged, the
legislature appears to be the proper forum. There are basically three
common avenues from which commentators choose. First, an act could
take the position that the embryos are not property but life which must
be protected from destruction. The opposite conclusion could be that the
embryos are property over which parties may dispute. The third option,
or middle ground, may be that the embryos are neither life nor property,
but because they offer the potential to become life, they should be treated
with respect and afforded limited rights.
This author proposes that the middle ground is a form of avoiding the
ultimate question. Affording embryos respect does not solve disputes, but
begs the question of "how much respect should they be afforded?" Because
the world presently has too many homeless and unwanted children, a
statute should not impose the burden of bringing all frozen embryos to
life. This is too much respect for potential life that ignores the realities
of the world.
Secondly, because the frozen embryo has not developed an embryonic
axis or any other distinctive characteristics, there is no reason to treat
- R.D. Hash argues that Danforth, reasoning that a spouse has no rights to
interfere with his wife's decision to seek or not seek an abortion, should apply to
in vitro fertilization. Hash states "[tihere is no question the state and the spouse
would have no authority if this was a purely natural reproductive process. Why
under these facts should it be treated any differently?" Final Supplemental Brief
of Amicus Curiae at 5, Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496 (5th Dist. Tenn. filed Sept.
21, 1989) (1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641), rev'd, No. 180 (Term. App. Sept. 13, 1990)
(1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642). Because the facts, especially that the embryo is
outside the mother's womb, are different, the same type of legal framework should
not apply.
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this embryo as human life. A statute should allow owners of such organ-
isms to decide their fate. Further, if a dispute between owners is involved,
because no human life has developed, the presumption in favor of letting
the organism expire should prevail over the other gamete provider's
wishes to bring the embryo to life. Because the gamete provider who
wishes to create life may always try again, either with one's own gametes
or those from donor's, new technology has afforded the gamete provider
that luxury. Because this option is possible, the gamete provider desiring
to sever all genetic links to his or her person should be entitled to such
a right.
A uniform act should be promulgated and submitted to each of the
separate states for adoption. The act should go beyond the mere problems
faced today and decide fundamental issues which will provide the basis
to solve tomorrow's problems. By doing this a more stable and predictable
body of law will develop, enabling the legal profession to meet the dilem-
mas new technology proposes.
MICHELLE F. SUBLETT
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